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In the Supre111e Court of
'The State of Utah
MAC PETERSON, as Executor of the Last
Will and Testament of John S. Peterson, Deceased,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
VERGA PETERSON ANDERSON,
Defendant and Appellant.

No. 7291

PART I
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In September of 1944, when John S. Peterson was 79
years of age, he transferred the title to a hotel property
which he owned in Gunnison, Utah, to his daughter, Verga
Peterson Anderson, defendant and appellant in this action,
upon her promise to make a home for him as long as he
lived; and he thereupon went to live at the hotel although
he owned a home just across the street. He continued to
live at the hotel until a few weeks before his death, which
occurred on February. 22, 1947, when he was moved across
to his own home because it was more convenient to take
care of him there than at the hotel.
John S. Peterson had made a will many years prior
to the transfer of the hotel property to Verga, in which
he bequeathed one-third of his estate to his wife, Maria,
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if she survived him and the remaining two-thirds to his
nine children in equal shares. His wife did not survive, and,
there being no residuary clause in the will, which remained
unchanged, he died intestate with respect to the one-third
of his estate bequeathed to his wife, which will go to his
nine children in equal shares under the laws of succession;
the other two-thirds going to them in the same shares
under the will.
Of his nine children two lived in Gunnison, namely,
Vance B. and Verga; two lived in Colorado and two in
California. The others lived elsewhere but the·record does
not give their places of residence.
While John S. was living at the hotel three of .his children obtained from him a considerable part of his estate
in money and in other property. His son, Alvie, got $3000.00.
No note or other memorandum was found relative to this
transaction, but Alvie acknowledges that he got it as a
loan from his father and promises to pay it back or take
credit against his share of the estate for the amount.
Vance B. got from the father a deed covering a furniture
store and meat market in Gunnison. While Verga got from
him four different sums of money at four different times,
namely, $600.00, $300.00, $500.00 and $4545.00.
The plaintiff brought this action against Verga to
recover those several sums, claiming that they represented
moneys which the father had lent to her and which she had
not repaid. (See the second cause of action in the complaint, Tr. 3.)
As there were no notes or other writings found among
the effects of the deceased to show the nature of the transactions respecting the moneys which Verga had received,
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as there was none relating to the transaction with Alvie ·
and also the deal with Vance B., we had to rely upon the
only evidence available, which came from the lips of the
defendant herself.
We calied witnesses who testified to statements and
declarations made by the defendant in the presence and
hearing of members of the family in which she admitted,
confessed and declared that, as to the $500.00 item and the
$4545.00 item, she had borrowed the money from her father for certain specific purposes.·
We deem it advisable to quote from their testimony as
it is contained in the bill of exceptions.
Billie Peterson Clinger, a sister of the defendant, referring to the $4545.00 item, testifie~ as follows:
"Q. All right, what happened?
"A. After we were discussing where it (the money
which had been withdrawn from the bank account) could
be and wondering and everything, Mrs. Anderson popped
out with-she said, "I know where the money went. Dad
paid off my mortgage at the bank for me and it was a
loan. He loaned me the money to pay off my mortgage."
"Q. Is that what she said?
"MR. LARSON: You say that is what she said?
"A. I definitely do. That is what she did say. She
said it was a loan to pay off her mortgage, that Dad had
loaned her that money.
"Q. How much was that?
"A. $4,500 some odd dollars, I am not sure of the
exact cents." (Tr. 7.)
In reference to the $500.00 item, she testified as follows:
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"Q. And then a $500.00_ check on May 27, 1946?
"A. That's right.
··Q. Did she tell you anything about that check, that
$500 check?

"A. Yes she did. She said that she told Dad that she
was going to take that and do· some extra alterations and
that she was going to give him the rent from those rooms.
"Q. Pay it back, to pay back that $500 to him?·
"A. That she would give him the revenue from the
rooms which she spent the $500 on to repay the loan.
"Q. Well, how did she happen to get the $500? Did
she tell you ?
"A. She was on a bond for my brother, Merrill, and
she wanted to be released from bond so Dad gave her this
$500 check to take care of her release.
"Q. To put up a cash bond?
"A. Yes, a cashier's check of $500 and when she took
that up it seems it wasn't enough, so she was going to try
to be released from his bond and put up this $500 cash but.
she found out it wasn't enough or for some other reason,
I don't know why, so she kept the cl.:eck and ~he check was
made out to Gilbert Fjelsted and then later she cashed that
check.
"Q. Did she say she was going to pay that back to
your father out of the rent from some rooms? (Tr. 8.)

"A. From the rooms. She told us that the way the
proposition was that she was to use the $500 to build those
rooms, and she made that proposition to Dad, and she was
going to repay him the $500 from the revenue from the
rooms. She was to pay him that as it came in. That is what
she told us." (Tr. 9.)
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Jessie Sprott, another sister of the defendant, testified as to this item of $4545.00 as follows:
"Q. Did the discussion relate to these missing checks,
check stubs?
"A. It did.
"Q. Did Verga say anything about it?"
"A. Yes, she told us - - "Q. What did she say?
"A. May I tell it in my own words?
"Q. Yes, I am asking you now to relate what she' said
in regard to those missing check stubs and the money that
had been taken out of the bank on the checks if there had
been any checks issued against stubs which had been removed?
"A. She stated that she had a premonition from my
mother in the night telling her to ask, have Dad pay off
the mortgage on her home, on the hotel. So 'she had Dad
pay off the mortgage for her as a loan and the other money,
it was just a mortgage on the hotel that we referred to at
that particular moment because that was the money that
had been taken from the estate and we were having more
difficulty checking on it." (Tr. 21.)
And on cross examination:
A. After all the commotion going on and she learned
how we were feeling and how upset we were and all about
it and one thing and another she said before that she
mentioned it was a loan and after she found how upset
we were about she said it was a gift." (Tr. 25.)
Veyda Peterson Pardoe, another sister of the · defendant, having testified that the members of the family met
after the funeral and were examining the bank account of
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their father and found that some of the check stubs were
missing from his book, Verga came in (Tr. 30), and she
testified as follows:
"Q. Did Verga make any statement at that time when

she came in regarding the missing check stubs?
"A. After so much discussion and she saw that they
were all excited and worked up about this she came over
and she said that is the money that Dad made a loan to
me to pay the mortgage off, or Dad loaned to me to pay
the mortgage off.
"Q. 'Vhat was she referring to when she made that
statement?
"A check for $4500 and some odd dollars.
"Q. All right what did she say about that check?

"A She said that was the money Dad had given her
to pay the mortgage, it was the money that Dad had
loned to her to pay the mortgage off at the bank. That
was the statement she made at the time. However, later
after there, was so much arguing and quarrelling she ~aw
there was no way of any of us getting together she came
and told us that it was a gift to her from Dad after she
admitted it being a loan.
"Q. When was it she told you it was a gift?
"A. I don't know whether it was that evening or the
next day but it was before we returned back to Colorado.
"Q. State whether or not she had been up and talked
to Mr. Larson in the meantime?
"A. Yes, she had. After that we never talked to her
except in Mr. Larson's presence.
"Q. And then it was that she told you it was a gift,
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is that right?
"A. That's right." (Tr. 31-32.)
Referring to the $500 item, she testified as follows:
"Q. Well what did she say about that item?

tl

:1
1
f

"A. She. said that she had gotten, wanted to be released from Merrill's bond and Dad nad given her a check
for $500 and that she had taken that money to fix up one
room on the main floor and told him that she would rent
that bedroom and he could have the money that was received in rent for it. She fixed a bedroom down there on
the main floor.
"Q. In the hotel ?
"A. In the hotel and she told us ·that she made the
arrangement with him that she would remodel this room
and then he was to have the rent from that particular
room for the $500, in payment of the $500." (Tr. 32-33.)
Mac Peterson, appellant's brother, referring to her
statements regarding the $4545.00 item, testified as follows:
"A. That was Thursday night. (Tr. 62.)
.
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· "Q. All right. What did Verga say about that item of
$4545.00?
"A. She made the statement that her Dad had loaned
her that money to pay off the mortgage of the Gunnison
Hotel." (Tr. 63.)
Referring to the item of $500 he testified:
"Q. Did you talk about an item of $500?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Did you find a stub for a check of $500?
"A. No, sir, I didn't." (Tr. 64.)
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Verga had remained silent about the $500 until after
Mac had found out about the $500 having been withdrawn
from the bank. (Tr. 66.)
Then she explained how she got the $500 to put up as
her part of a cash bond for Merrill. (Tr. 67.)
"Q. That $500 cashier's bank check had been credited

in September to the account of Mrs. Anderson and her
husband in the name of the hotel?
"A. That is right.
"Q. Well, then did you confront Verga with that and
ask her to explain it ?
"A. Yes.
"Q. And what did she say about that?
"A. She said that Dad had made her a loan of that,
that money to fix up another room.
"Q. In the hotel ?
"A. In the hotel. There was one room in the dining
room that she was going to have converted and made into
a bedroom and she said that she had used that $500 to
convert that dining room into another bedroom and tha.t
she was going to pay him back out of the proceeds of the
room. Pay him back the $500 out of the proceeds of the
room." (Tr. 68.)
Counsel for appellant in the brief, at page 20, says:
"Defendant, as a witness, however, denied
making the statements attributed to her by plaintiff's witnesses. She offered witnesses who corroborated her denial that she had srtated the money
was a loan."
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9

The record does not bear out counsel's statement. The
defendant did not deny that she made any of the statements which were attributed to her by the witnesses above
mentioned; nor did she offer any witnesses to corroborate
her denial. We have carefully read and reread her testimony and we find therein no such denial.
So we assert that the testimony given by the witnesses and which we have set out verbatim from the
transcript stands undenied by the defendant.

Upon the foregoing evidence the court found as facts
that on Januart.{ 29, 1946, the defendant borrowed from
JohnS. Peterson the sum of $4545.00, and that on or about
May 31, 1946, she borrowed from him $500.00, which sums
she had not paid back to him nor to the executor; and
entered judgment for said sums and interest. (See: Finding
of Fact 4, and Judgment. Tr. 29 and 30.)
Before proceeding with our argument, there is one
other statement made in appellant's brief, on page 25, to
which we wish to advert. It is as follows :
"The trial court itself states that the proof
of the circumstances under which defendant· received the money was somewhat vague."
Such statement of counsel, if it is intended to refer
to the items of $500 and $4545, is a palpable misstatement
of the record; for what the court referred to, when he said,
in deciding the case, that the proof was vague, were the
items of $300 and $600. And because the proof was vague
in regard to those items the court found the issues in favor
of the defendant and against the plaintiff. (Tr. 110.)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10

PART II
ARGUMENT
The argument of coun~el is that admissions are not
competent evidence upon which to rest findings of fact upon
material issues; that the only evidence in this case to
prove that Verga borrowed the money from her father is
found in her admissions; and that therefore finding No. 4,
upon which the judgment rests, is not supported by any
competent evidence.
We challenge that argument at the major premise and
at the conclusion.
Admissions
We declare that admissions against interest are competent evidence against a party and are sufficient to sustain findings upon material issues; and that finding No. 4
is supported by sufficient, and indeed, by undisputed and
uncontradicted evidence in this case.
That admissions are competent evidence and that they
are sufficient evidence upon which to rest findings of fact
upon material issues has already been· decided by this
court. The proposition is not open to argument at this late
date. It was decided adversely to appellant's contention in
the case of Mehr v. Childs, et al., 90 Utah 348, 61, P 2d.
624, which is one of the case'S ci.ted in our opponent's brief.
In that case there was an issue of fact whether or
not a child of the defendants who was driving their car
was their servant or agent at the time of an accident. The
plaintiff and another witness testified, that in the spring
of the year following the accident they went to the home
of the defendants; and that at that time the defendants
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said that on the occasion in question their daughter, Alberta, had taken the car not only with their consent but
that they sent her to Ogden to get another daughter who
was working there. Defendants denied making any such
statements. The question before this court was : Does the
evidence support a finding that Alberta Child was the
agent or servant of !lppellants at the time of the collision?
Mr. Chief Justice Elias Hanson, writing the opinion for
the court says :
"It is earnestly urged by appellants that the first question must, as a matter of law, be considered in the negative. The law applicable to admissions is thus stated in 3
Jones Commentaries on Evidence (2nd Ed.) p. 1973, (Sec.)
1072: ''When an admission is clearly proved and shown to
have been made with deliberation, it is not necessarily
weak evidence, nor does it require corroboration; on the
contrary, when admissions are so proved, they may have
great inherent force as evidence. To the extent of the subject matter of the admission, it makes out a prima facie
case and dispenses with other proof of the fact admitted
until rebutted. And a finding of fact, resting solely upon
an extrajudicial admission, is not, for that reason, unsupported by substantial evidence."
The court goes on to say that. numerous cases cited
in the footnote support the text; and that the law announced in the foregoing text is cited and followed by this
court in the case of Peterson v. Richards, 73 Utah 59, 272
P. 229_; and the court concludes its discussion of this subject with this sentence:
"The verdict and judgment are not vuln~rable to the
attack that they were without support in the evidence."
The admissions relied on in this case were clearly
proved. Four witnesses testified· to them. The defendant
did not deny that she made such admissions. It is also
apparent from the record that she made them with deliberaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tion. The record shows that she stood around all afternoon,
.while Mac and Billie were trying to find out who got the·
money from their father's bank account, knowing all the
time where the money went; it also shows that she tried to
conceal from the knowledge of the family the fact that she
had obtained this money from her father, by abstracting
the stubs from the check book; and that she did not
open her mouth to inform the family what had become of
the money until Merrill accused Vance of getting it and
until everybody got mad and it looked like there was going
to be a fist fight among the family. After all these things
had transpired, she finally came out with her statements
which the witnesses related. She confessed that she had
got the money and that she had borrowed it from her
father, the $4545.00 to pay the mortgage on the hotel and
the $500 to fix up a room in the hotel. She did not even
suggest by anything she said at first that her father had
intended to give the money to her but what she did say
clearly proves that she felt obliged to pay it back to him
or to his estate. It was not until after she had been up to
Manti and talked with her attorney that she put forth the
claim that these items were gifts.
There are no surrounding circumstances which support the theory of a gift. There was no reason why JohnS.
Peterson should give Verga this money, even if he did
lend it to her, or let her have it as an advancement. He
had given her the hotel, a valuable property; he had also
given her $300 and $600 in two previous transactions. She
was taking care of him at the hotel and she must have
thought that she was being well paid for that service. He
had let Alvie have $3000, without a note or other writing,
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but this admittedly was a loan and not a gift. He intended
that all his children should share equally in his estate, as
evidenced by the fact that he so provided in his will.
He did not voluntarily pay off the mortgage on the
hotel because he did not want to live under a roof with a
mortgage on it. He paid off the mortgage because she
asked him to do so. She went over to the bank with him
when he paid it off. (Tr. 106.)
As far as the $500 is concerned, she got that money
to use as a cash bond for Merrill and then used it to :fix up
another room in the hotel and promised her father that she
would pay it back out of the rent.
She spoke the truth when she first opened her heart
and disclosed to the family how she got all that money
from her father. It was only after further deliberation and
consultation with her attorney that she came out with the
idea that the money was given to her outright.
The testimony of the witnesses above outlined, co~pled
with the fact that defendant attempted to conceal and did
conceal from the family the nature of her transactions with
her father, and that she removed stubs from the check
book to that end, brought conviction to the mind of the
trial judge that the money which she received was intended
by the parties to the transaction to be lent and not given;
and that it should be repaid and not kept.
The trial judge saw the witnesses, observed their demeanor and manner of testifying, and appraised their
credibility; and, doubtless, took into consideration the fact
that defendant, though she had the opportunit:r to do so,
did not deny that she made the statements attributed to
her by her brother and sisters. And having done these
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things, the trial judge found as a fact that defendant borrowed the money from her father. The trial judge evidently did not believe the defendant when she afterward
stated that her father gave the money to her.

The Weight of Evidence
If this is an action :;tt law, as we think it is, our brief
might well end at this point; for in that case the findings
of the tri&l court which are challenged on this appeal are
binding upon this court, being supported by some competent evidence. If thi'S is a law case this court is limited to
a review of the evidence to see whether there is any competent evidence to support the findings; and this court
will not weigh ,the evidence to see where it preponderates;
Furthermore, if this is a law case, then the trial court is
the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and of
the weight to be given to their testimony and it is solely
for the trial court to draw the inferences of fact from the
te'Stimony of the witnesses. So if this is a law case then
we ought not to impose upon the court any further argument, having demonstrated by the evidence which we have
set out and the case which we have cited that the challenged finding is supported by competent evidence.
But the appellant, assuming that this is an equity
case, has also argued that the challenged finding is contrary to the weight of the evidence. And as we have no
way of forecasting what the court may think about the
ease, whether it is at law or in equity, we feel it advisable
that we give the court the benefit of our views upon the
subject of the weight of the evidence.
On that subject we say that there is no evidence in
the case which requires a finding different from the one
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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made by the trial court .
. The evidence upon which the court based its finding
stands undisputed. The defendant did not say, when she
had the opportunity to do so, if she desired to do so, that
she did not make the statements attributed to her by her
brother and three of her sisters. She was not asked either
in direct or in cross examination to admit or to deny these
statements: All she testified to was that later, after she
had consultt:Xl her attorney, she claimed that her father
· had given her the money.
No witness for the defendant testified to anything
which would compel finding in favor of the defendant.
Even if John S. Peterson made the statements attributed
to him by the defendant, her son, her husband, her servant
and her friend, there is nothing in them which requires
the court to conclude that he did not intend that Verga
should repay the money either to him or to his estate.
There is nothing in those statements inconsistent with the
idea of debt; there is nothing in them which compels the
idea of gift; or even of gift by way of advancement. They
only go to show that John S. felt good because he had
helped Verga by paying off the m.ortgage on the hotel.
Furthermore, they do not refer to the $500 item which is
included in the judgment.
Presumptions
Appellant contends that there is a presumption that
the father gave the money to his daughter. (Page 21 of
the brief.) But so far as presumptions are concerned, if
we were to rest the case upon presumptions, we submit the
law is not in favor of the defendant. Counsel cites, among
others, the case of In re Pickenbrock's Estate, 102 Iowa,
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81, 70 N.-w. 1094, 26 A. L. R. 1146, to the proposition that
there is a presumption that the money was a gift.
In this connection we call the court's attention to the
~act that that case is cited in the note in 26 A. L. R. 1146,
to the following paragraph:
"A number of cases support the doctrine that a
payment by a parent uf a substantial amount to
discharge a debt of a child will be deemed prima
f'acie to be intended as an advancement."
Also, we call the court's attention to the following paragraph in that same note, appearing at page 1108 of 26

A. L. R.:
"It is the general rule supported by many
cases that, unless there is something in the circumstances to raise the inference of a different purpose a substantial gift of money or property from
a parent to a child will ordinarily be presumed to
be an advancement."

Since we feel that the foregoing statements are sound
law, the presumption in this case, if we had to depend upon
presumptions, would be that these were advancements and
not outright gifts.
But we are not required to depend upon presumptions.
We have sufficient evidence in the case to show that John
S. intended to help his daughter by lending her the money,
which evidence comes from her own lips.
It may be admitted that there are three possible conclusions one of which may be drawn from the circumstances
shown in evidence, if we lay aside the defendant's admissions and consider only the other facts in the case, namely:
(1) That the money was a gift; (2) that it was a gift by
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way of an advancement; and (3) that it was a loan. Defendant's admissions aside, probably the finding should
have been that this was a gift by way of advancement,
which should have been. charged against defendant's share
in the estate. But when her admissions are put into the

scales, the balance is all in favor of number 3.
We therefore respectfully submit that the challenged
finding is supported by the preponderence of the evidence.
IN GENERAL
As to the various matters discussed and cases and statutes cited on pages 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 of the opposing brief,
we have no quarrel except one statement, which is this,
found on page 16:
"Likewise, if there is evidence to support
them (findings), then said findings should be supported by a statement thereof."
We do not understand that such is the rule of practice.
The findings must be supported by the evidence or by allegations in the pleadings which are admitted by the adversary. But it is never required that the court state the evidence which supports the findings.
CONCLUSION
We accepted the burden of proof and carried it; the
court made findings of fact which support the judgment;
those findings are supported by competent evidence, and
also by the preponderence of the evidence.
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We respectfully submit that there is no error in the
record, that the judgment does justice between the parties,
and that it should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

DILWORTH WOOLLEY,
THERALD N. JENSEN,
Respondent's Attorneys.
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